The section on Moral Internalism is slightly inaccurate, or at least misleading. Internalism is the metaethical view that an agent can not judge something to be right and yet still not be the least bit motivated to perform it. As such, it is really a semantic claim about the meaning of moral vocabulary: whether or not it is part of the meaning of "that is right" or "that is wrong" that the speaker approves or disapproves respectively of an action. Internalism, then, (as intended by analytic philosophers,) is totally compatible with the Orthogonality Thesis. (Internalism + Orthogonality = noncognitivism or relativism or nihilism.) IIRC, Hume himself was an Internalist!
Sources: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-motivation/
I suggest changing the section to either "Realist Moral Internalism" or a more comprehensive examination of the options available to the AI-grade philosopher when it comes to moral motivation.