Due partly to the choice of using 'value' as a speaker dependent variable, some of the terminology used in this article doesn't align with how the terms are used by professional metaethicists. I would strongly suggest one of:
1) replacing the phrase "moral internalism" with a new phrase that better individuates the concept.
2) including a note that the phrase is being used extremely non-standardly.
3) adding a section explaining the layout of metaethical possibilities, using moral internalism in the sense intended by professional metaethicists.
In metaethics, moral internalism, roughly, is the disjunction:
'Value' is speaker independent and universally compelling OR 'Value' is speaker dependent and is only used to indicate properties the speaker finds compelling
This seems very un-joint-carvy from a perspective of value allignment, but most philosophers see internalism as a semantic thesis that captures the relation between moral judgements and motivation. The idea is: If someone says something has value, she values that thing. This is very very different from how the term is used in this article.
I can provide numerous sources to back this up, if needed.